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ESSAYS
FROM ASKHABAD, TO WELLTON-MOHAWK,
TO LOS ANGELES: THE DROUGHT IN
WATER POLICY
DAVID

H.

GETCHES*

INTRODUCTION

Water policy in the United States is typically little more than
a description of legal systems in which a few interests control
historically imbedded rights. Policies in other areas express goals
for society; laws are then shaped to achieve them. Thus, criminal
laws attempt to preserve order, deter misconduct, remove dangerous
people from society, treat victims fairly, and so on. The goals of
water policy tend to be confined to respecting existing rights and
rewarding development. Western states are lately realizing that economic stability, human health, ecological balance, and survival of
urban and rural communities all have a nexus in water. Widening
public concerns over the untoward effects of "lawful" water uses
have led to some modest reforms in water laws. The response,
however, falls short of a comprehensive water policy.
This essay looks at three examples of the failure to consider
the policy implications of water decisions, producing results that
range from absurd to tragic. The three stories are dramatically
different in geography, cultural settings, and consequences. Each
has in common the absence of a comprehensive water policy. Water
decisions have charted the direction of land use, social relations,

economics, and the ecological character of areas throughout the
world, especially those in arid regions. In each case, a consciously
developed water policy would have been a context for looking
comprehensively at the aspirations of society.

With the advent of the Soviet Union following the Bolshevik
Revolution came the mandate to the Central Asian republics to
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. This essay was originally presented as
the 1992 Austin W. Scott, Jr. Lecture. The author is grateful for the research assistance of
University of Colorado School of Law students Casey Mulligan, Class of 1992, William
Hugenberg, Class of 1993, and Kevin Clarke, Class of 1993.
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produce cotton on a massive scale. When the necessary water was
turned to the task no one dared to ask about the consequences or
paused to develop a policy that defined what the whole society
wanted or needed from the region's water. Today, the misery of
millions of people and the destruction of the productive capacity
and ecological integrity of an entire region are attributable to the
failure to confront water policy.
The Wellton-Mohawk District in Southern Arizona became the
object of Bureau of Reclamation beneficence without anyone asking
whether its irrigation project made sense physically, economically,
or politically. The project's infeasibility was repeatedly proved, and
its environmental effects even caused an international conflict. Still,
fundamental questions about the project and the wisdom or effects
of continued commitments of water to it were avoided.
Southern California's monstrous problems of traffic, pollution,
crime, and infrastructure all relate to water availability. Growth and
sprawl have proceeded apace, and water managers understand that
it is their duty to serve up water wherever and whenever it is
demanded. A decision has implicitly been made that water policy
will not be the touchstone for dealing with broader issues.
In each case, political and legal institutions enabled decisions
to be made to effect short-term, single-purpose objectives. Only the
narrow concerns of a few people were admitted in the process.
Thus, far-reaching consequences, many of them easily predictable,
could be disregarded by isolating the decisions and insulating the
decisionmakers from accountability.
I argue that water policy should comprehend fully society's
goals and the role of water allocation and development in achieving
them. It should consider all the ramifications of devoting water to
particular purposes. Comprehensive water policies demand wide
participation, with processes open to the people, communities, and
affected interests. Water decisions must be integrated with commitments to use or conserve other natural resources, with decisions
that guide the destiny of communities and economies, and with
efforts to secure the well being and sustainability of society generally.
I.

THE ARAL BASIN, CENTRAL

ASIA

Central Asia is desert. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgyzstan,
Tadjikistan, Kazakhstan, all formerly republics of the Soviet Union,
are now members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.'
1. The Commonwealth of Independent States was formed on December 21, 1991 to

1993]

THE DROUGHT IN WATER POLICY

Virtually everyone is an ethnic Muslim, 2 descended from the tribes
that aboriginally occupied the region and that continue to have
influence.3 The region was eventually conquered by the Russians
and became part of the Soviet Union in the 1920s. 4 The main
industry is irrigated cotton farming, and it is in decline.' Two northflowing rivers of Central Asia, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya,
drain the mountains to the south that are shared with Afghanistan
and Iran, and then spill into the Aral Sea. At least they did so
historically.
Canals lay wide the desert's sands, losing more water than they
deliver. The city of Ashkabad, capital of Turkmenistan needs 150
wells just to eject the groundwater that rises into yards, buildings,
and the root zones of plants .6 Farmlands are rendered unproductive
as soils become saline and waterlogged, their nutrients leached out
by repeated flooding with irrigation water. 7 Virtually all of the water
destined for the Aral Sea is now devoted to irrigation.'
The Aral has been called a dying sea, 9 surely an understatement.
By most measures, the Aral Sea is already dead. It has shrunk in
volume by over 60% since 1960; its water is about 3% salt; twenty
of its twenty-four indigenous species of fish are extinct; 135 animal
include eleven of the twelve former Soviet republics. David Remnick, In New Commonwealth
of 'Equals,' Russia Remains the Dominant Force: Historical Status, Space-Age Arms Ensure
Regional Primacy, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1991, at A39.
2. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, only about eight percent of the people are
Russians. Soviet Central Asia; The Next Islamic Revolution, ECONOMST, Sept. 21, 1991, at

58.
3. IvAR SPECTOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE 139-40 (5th
ed. 1969). Even after 70 years of Soviet rule, Turkmenistan was described as "more a tribal
confederation than a modern nation." Annette Bohr, Turkmenistan Under Peristroika: An
Overview, REP. ON U.S.S.R., Mar. 23, 1990, at 20, 21.
4. RICHARD A. PIERCE, RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA 1867-1917, at 1-5 (1960).
5. Boris Rumer, Central Asia's Cotton: The Picture Now, CENT. ASIAN SURv., 1987
(No. 4), at 75; Gregory Gleason, Marketization and Migration: The Politics of Cotton in
CentralAsia, J. SOVIET NATIONALITIES, Summer 1990, at 66.
6. Norman Precoda, Requiem for the Aral Sea, Amlo, May, 1991, at 109, 112; D.J.
Peterson, The State of the Environment: The Water, REP. ON U.S.S.R., Mar. 16, 1990, at
14, 15.

7. Precoda, supra note 6, at 111, 113. It is estimated that irrigation projects and poor
practices account for the loss of one million hectares (2.47 million acres) of irrigable lands.
N.F. Glazovsky, The Aral Crisis: The Source, The Current Situation, and the Ways to Solving
It 4 (unpublished paper presented to United Nations Environment Programme Meeting on

"Assistance for Preparation of Action Plan for Conservation of the Aral Sea," Sept. 16 Oct. 3, 1990).
8. Peterson, supra note 6, at 15. For a description of the ecological disaster, see
William S. Ellis, The Aral: A Soviet Sea Lies Dying, NAT'L GEOGRAPIc, Feb. 1990, at 73,
84.
9. Ellis, supra note 8, at 73.
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species and half of all the bird species are gone. 0 But the Aral is
only one festering symptom of much greater ills. There are sick and
dying people. Some are victims of a 500% increase in throat cancer"
from inhaling the dust and toxic salts that swirl up when winds lash
across the exposed lake bed.' 2 This dust settles as far away as the
Arctic Ocean 3 and has raised the level of particulates in the Earth's
atmosphere a full five percent. 14 Moreover, the loss of the sea has

markedly changed climate patterns in the region. 5
Infant mortality in the region rivals the worst rates in third
world countries. 16 Food fish are harvested directly from pesticidelaced irrigation canals.17 The economy is in shambles. 8 Once-thriving
seafront fishing villages are stranded amidst desert salt flats, miles

from the sea.' 9 Fishing and fish processing, industries that once
employed sixty thousand people, have been destroyed following the
sea's precipitous decline. 20 And the problems are even deeper and

more endemic.
Once the fourth largest inland waterbody in the world, 2' the
sea is a casualty of a misconceived Soviet political-economic system
that created the worst collection of environmental calamities in the
10. Philip P. Micklin, Desiccation of the Aral Sea: A Water Management Disaster in
the Soviet Union, 241 SCIENCE 1170, 1171-73 (1988); see also V.M. Kotlyakov, The Aral Sea
Basin: A Critical Environmental Zone, ENv'T, Jan./Feb. 1991, at 4, 6-7.
11. Ellis, supra note 8, at 90; see also Kotlyakov, supra note 10, at 8 (describing other
health consequences). Typhoid has increased 30-fold and hepatitis 7-fold in the last 15 years.
Id.
12. Micklin, supra note 10, at 1172.
13. Id.
14. Douglas Stanglin, Toxic Wasteland, U.S. NEws & WoaIL REP., Apr. 13, 1992, at
40, 43.
15. Precoda, supra note 6, at 111. The sea formerly served as a barrier against cold
north winds. Its depletion therefore removed the barrier, exposing the region to the drying
and erosive effects of winds and contributing to more severe temperature extremes. See
Kotlyakov, supra note 10, at 6.
16. The infant mortality rate exceeds 50 per 1000 births. Kotlyakov, supra note 10, at
8. Estimates for some areas of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan range as high as 73 per 1000.
Patricia M. Carley, The Price of the Plan: Perceptions of Cotton and Health in Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, CENT. ASIAN Suav., 1989 (No. 4), at 1, 2. 1989 rates for other nations
are: Brazil, 67 per 1000; Kenya, 70 per 1000; Honduras, 60 per 1000; India, 91 per 1000;
Libya, 70 per 1000; USSR, 25.2 per 1000; U.S., 10 per 1000; Canada, 7.3 per 1000. WORLD
ALMANAC 734-821, 939 (1992).
17. Micklin, supra note 10, at 1172.
18. See Asal Azamova, The ProhibitiveCost of Dictatorship,Moscow NEws, Sept. 30,
1992 (describing an economy on the brink of ruin).
19. Philip Micklin, Touring the Aral: Visit to an Ecologic Disaster Zone, SOVIET
GEoORa.PrY, Feb. 1991, at 90, 92-95.
20. Micklin, supra note 10, at 1172.
21. Id. at 1170. Today it has shrunk in area to sixth among the world's lakes. Id.
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history of the world. The Soviets committed "ecocide, ' 22 squandering their natural wealth in a desperate attempt to maintain
economic power.
Last September, just after the failed CoUp, 23 I stepped off a
cumbersome and worn Aeroflot jet in Ashkabad, capital of the
Republic of Turkmenistan. I was still dressed for the chilly drizzle
of a fall day in perpetually gray Moscow. Here there were Turkmen
in their loose, colorful tribal costumes, hunkering in the shade of
palms. Warm breezes whipped up dust and blotted the bright sky.
I went to Central Asia as part of a National Academy of Sciences
delegation investigating how to help the newly independent governments develop new laws and institutions adequate to revamp and
revive their ailing system. They asked about "privatization" and
hoped for an American formula that would solve their problems.
After a rigorous trip, studying the situation further, and consulting
with others, I concluded that the demise of Soviet Communism was
not enough to revive the Aral, and furthermore, that our own
system of water decisionmaking is not exempt from the kind of
failings suffered in Central Asia.
What went wrong in Central Asia? What caused the Aral Sea
disaster? After the Bolshevik Revolution, a decision was made in
Moscow to dedicate lands colonized by the Tsars in Central Asia
to cotton production for the entire Union. The capacity to grow
cotton in the region had been shown in Tsarist times, and indeed
the crop was cultivated aboriginally using practices of crop diversity
and rotation.24 Obsessed with becoming independent of other nations
in cotton production, political leaders in Moscow declared pursuit
of that goal to be the "patriotic duty" of all Central Asians; 25 by
26
1937, the USSR was exporting cotton.
The preoccupation with cotton caused Soviet leaders to disregard accumulated wisdom concerning irrigated agriculture in arid
regions as well as expert advice from within. They launched a
massive irrigation scheme to drain the basin's rivers and irrigate
22. MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED

FRIENDLY,

JR., ECOCIDE IN THE

U.S.S.R:

HEALTH

AND NATURE UNDER SEIGE (1992).

23. On August 19, 1991, several opponents of Mikhail Gorbachev detained him in an
attempt to oust him from leadership. The coup was aborted, however. Soviet Turmoil; The
Soviet Coup and Its Aftermath: A Recap, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 25, 1991, at 16.
24. Rumer, supra note 5, at 84.
25. Ellis, supra note 8, at 76; Gleason, supra note 5, at 68; Gregory Gleason, The
Pakhta Programme: The Politics of Sowing Cotton in Uzbekistan, CENT. AsLAN SutRV., 1983,

at 109, 111; Carley, supra note 16, at 18.
26. Ellis, supra note 8, at 76.
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wide expanses of desert. The project began operations in 1956.27 It
was a foreseeable disaster, destined to rank among the world's
greatest irrigation-induced ecological collapses.
The hazards of major trans-basin diversions of water and
excessive irrigation practices in arid societies had been demonstrated
for millennia, but were ignored. 2 Ancient civilizations from the
Sumerians to the Maya faded away because of their excessive use
of land and water. 29 Soviet scientists predicted the dire consequences
for the Aral Sea and its ecosystem if the Amu Darya and Syr Darya
were exploited as planned; their advice was rejected.30
Sacrificing the region to a cotton monoculture succeeded in
making the Soviet Union a major exporter, but it was done by
deferring huge economic and social costs to the Republics. A former
Uzbek First Secretary said the cotton policy had been carried to
"monstrous proportions."'" Local political leaders blamed the government's single-minded policy for economic distress, political corruption, mass unemployment, low wages and environmental
destruction.3 2 According to a 1987 article: "By being transformed
into virtually one great cotton plantation, Uzbekistan embarked on
a long tragic experiment-to determine the capacity of a monoculture to corrode not only agriculture, but also industry, education,
health, and finally public morality." 3 3
Ill-considered water policy traces to the core of the Soviet
system: single-purpose, central decisionmaking, the subservient position of the Republics, and a refusal to consider the consequences
of pursuing a set goal. Poor water-use practices-indeed, most of
Central Asia's ills-are the product of mandates requiring the south27. Id. at 81. The central feature of the project is the Karakum Canal that takes the
water of the Amu Darya in an earthen channel across the desert. At 850 miles in length, the
Karakum is the world's longest canal. There is no return to the river. Id.
28. Consider two well-known examples-one ancient, one contemporary-that the Soviets ignored: 1) The great transverse canals built after the Muslim conquest between the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers destroyed the productive capacity of that area by 1500. McGuire
Gibson, Violation of Fallow and Engineered Disaster in Mesopotamian Civilization, in IRRIGATION'S IMPACT ON SOCIETY

7, 15 (Theodore E. Downing & McGuire Gibson eds., 1974); 2)

The Indus Valley in Pakistan was losing an estimated 50,000 acres of farm lands per year by
1960, due to salinity and waterlogging from poor irrigation practices. ALoys A. MICHEL, THE
INDUS RIVERS: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF PARTITION 483 (1967).
29. CLIVE PONTIG, A GREEN HISTORY OF THE WORLD 72, 82-83 (1992).
30. Micklin, supra note 10, at 1172.
31. Gregory Gleason, "Birlik" and the Cotton Question, REP. ON U.S.S.R., June 15,
1990, at 19, 21.
32. Id. See also Gleason, supra note 5, at 68.
33. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, Feb. 11,1987, at 12, quoted in Rumer, supra note 5, at
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ern republics to devote their respective resources to a cotton monoculture.3 4 Those practices, in turn, have caused or exacerbated
virtually all of Central Asia's serious economic, environmental, and
health problems. Water thus links the most critical problems of the
area to policy choices that perhaps for the first time in seventy
years can now be reconsidered.
Experts in the Turkmen water development agency told us of
their solution. Their dream is to carve another canal through the
desert, up into the heartland of Siberia, damming and diverting the
Ob and Irtysh Rivers before their waters pour into the Arctic.35
These virgin rivers could be drained and their waters transported
1,400 miles to Central Asia. A new water supply could open more
lands to cultivation to replace those depleted and destroyed by
salinity. The proposal would also add a token share of the water
to the Aral.
The Siberian project is fraught with problems including enor36
mous cost and a host of unknown environmental consequences. It
reprises the root cause of Central Asia's problems, attempting to
solve one water problem by pouring more water on it, without
concern for the consequences. Nevertheless, any argument for building the massive canal from Siberia to Central Asia is probably moot.
The billions of dollars it would cost are surely not available in the
individual states (republics), and absent a functional central government, the only possible source is bilateral or multilateral investment.
Given the egregious problems of the Commonwealth, an elaborate
water project is not likely to be a high priority for foreign aid.
More feasible options exist for returning more water to the.
Aral, perhaps stabilizing the level, and controlling some of the
pollution problems. They include lining ditches and canals so that
they will not leak, improving irrigation methods so not as much
water will be used, installing drainage systems, retiring some agri-

34. See Rumer, supra note 5, at 81-85. The situation has some remarkable similarities
to the power relationships described by theorists who argue that in an "irrigation society"
political institutions tend toward strong centralized control and exploitation of people and
resources. An elite is empowered through controlling water, allocating capital for water
development, administering construction of huge water works, and running the system. The
elite then dominates the resulting economic surpluses. The theory of the "irrigation society"
or "hydraulic society" is developed by KARL A. WITFFOGEL, ORIENTAL DaspoTsm: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER (1957).

Era,"

35. Philip P. Micklin, The Fate of "Sibaral": Soviet Water Politics in the Gorbachev
CENT. AsIAN SuRv., 1987 (No. 2), at 67, 70-75.
36. Id. at 80-81.
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cultural lands, and reducing chemical use.37 Surely there would be
some benefits felt in the Aral basin. But not enough of those benefits
would accrue to the people of the individual state that would have
to sacrifice its water or money; they would have to do it for the
sake of the Aral. While discussing these options a stern water official
in Ashkabad, pounding his fist on the table, insisted that if his
government invests in a better irrigation system, "not a drop of
saved water would go into the Aral; all of it will go to new farms
in Turkmenistan." 3 For him, water that flows into the Aral is
wasted. As a Turkmen, he is unmoved by the problem of polluted
water flowing out of Turkmenistan and into Uzbekistan.
Many people in Central Asia attribute the problem to the
Soviets' forcing the Central Asian republics to grow cotton to the
exclusion of everything else, including scarce food crops. Now they
are in charge of their own destiny. They can simply diversify to
grow scarce food crops and, while they are at it, rotate plantings
to give the ravaged soils a chance to rebuild. But will they? Cotton
commands a market return many times that of most food crops
and it is an exportable commodity, producing desperately needed
foreign exchange.39 It will be a tough choice for struggling, impoverished new nations.
Rivalries among the republics compound the economic motives
for competition and frustrate efforts toward cooperation. In June,
1990, 300 people were killed and 1,000 injured when Uzbeks rioted
against Kirgyzians who had reassigned land and water rights near
Osh. 40 We know Central Asians are capable of violence against their
neighbors. There is no prior history of cooperation, mutual problemsolving, and regional statesmanship that is needed to solve the Aral
Sea problem. The people of the region have been left out of decisions
on their own fate for generations. A group of decisionmakers was
trying to satisfy a central government goal of economic growth.
They were not accountable to anyone but central economic planners;
there was no need to placate environmentalists and local residents

37. Cf. Micklin, supra note 10, at 1174-75; Kotlyakov, supra note 10, at 9, 36-38. A
host of committees and international working groups are addressing these issues. Professor
Peter Rogers notes that in 1990 alone, 106 conferences were held on the Aral Sea disaster.
Peter Rogers, Commentary, The Aral Sea, ENv'T, Jan./Feb. 1991, at 2, 3.
38. Interview with Moses M. Sarkisov, Director of Project Research Institute, Department of Water Design, in Ashkabad, Turkmenistan (Sept. 16, 1991).
39. See Rumer, supra note 5, at 76-77. Cotton exports declined 250o from 1980 to
1985. Id.
40. Gleason, supra note 5, at 91.
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under their system. The old Soviet political system, then, explains
how the Aral Sea disaster was set in motion.
II.

WELLTON-MOHAWK DISTRICT, ARIZONA

Now, to illustrate that there is more than one way to make
bad decisions, consider the case of the Wellton-Mohawk Project.
Farmers in this southwest Arizona district were suffering from salt
build-up in their irrigated soils, an inevitable result of flooding
saline soils repeatedly to produce crops. In this case, farmers used
and reused water pumped from wells near the bed of the dry Gila
River. The return flows seeped back to the groundwater, making it
saltier and saltier after each use. When crops declined, they sought
4
federal assistance and got it. 1
First, the federal Bureau of Reclamation built eighty-six miles
of canals to bring them supplemental water from the Colorado
River so they could irrigate and flush out the soils. This worked
for about six years. The land, as everyone knew, lay over a closed
groundwater basin. Once water seeped beneath the ground it accumulated in a bowl-like formation of bedrock and, predictably,
the "bowl" filled. Eventually, salty groundwater rose into the root
zone of crops and began to kill them.
The Bureau of Reclamation again came to the rescue. This
time, it installed deep wells to pump down the salty groundwater
and a pipeline to carry it away and dump it into the Colorado
River, upstream of where farmers in Mexico divert water.42 The
Mexicans are guaranteed water by a 1944 treaty with the United
States.43 The only water flowing at that point in the river is the
trickle left after users in the United States are finished with it.
Upriver in Colorado, Wyoming and Utah, farmers take water out
and send their return flows back to the river. Cities pump some of
it over mountain ranges, leaving less and less water that becomes
saltier with each successive use. Others take water out of the main
stem, some for use along the river; much more is drawn out by the
behemoth diversions for users in Los Angeles, the Imperial Valley,
and Arizona cities. By the time the share of water promised to
41. Joseph Friedkin, The International Problem with Mexico Over the Salinity of the
Lower Colorado River, in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RAPHAEL
J. MOSES 31, 46-47 (David H. Getches ed., 1988). For a discussion of issues surrounding the
Yuma Desalination Plant, see M~Auc REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 481-82 (1986).
42. Friedkin, supra note 41, at 46.
43. Treaty for the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado, Tijuana and Rio Grande
Rivers, Feb. 13, 1944, U.S.-Mex., art. 10, 59 Stat. 1219.
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Mexico reaches the Mexican intake, it is already very salty.4 Add
to it the brine being pumped out of the Wellton-Mohawk wells and
it is a crop-killing brew.
In 1961, the year Wellton-Mohawk discharges started, Glen
Canyon Dam upstream at the Arizona-Utah border was on the verge
of completion. 4 The government would soon need every drop of
water not promised to Mexico to fill Lake Powell. The salty discharges from Wellton-Mohawk polluted the river so badly that it
was useless for farming. Not surprisingly, the Mexican government
formally protested the U.S. action." At first, the United States took
the position that the Mexican Treaty guaranteed only water, not
necessarily usable water. After unpleasant publicity and intensive
negotiations, including meetings between President Kennedy and
President Mateos of Mexico, the government established maximum
levels of salinity for future water deliveries from the U.S. 47
A few years later, the two governments finally settled on a
plan that created more work for the Bureau of Reclamation: construction of an extension of the Wellton-Mohawk discharge canal
below the Mexican intake and even more wells to rid the district of
salty groundwater." This was controversial in the U.S. because it
meant that the U.S. did not get credit for delivering an amount of
water to Mexico under the treaty equivalent to the discharges below
the Mexican intake. Consequently, users in the U.S. might, have to
curtail their water use. Even with the plan, the water reaching
Mexico remained too salty to use much of the time.
Originally, the simplest solution would have been to stop the
source of most of the salt: drainage from Wellton-Mohawk. But it
would have been unthinkable for the Bureau of Reclamation to
close down the project and admit that it had been impracticable
and ill-conceived from the start. Changing much of the WelltonMohawk District to non-irrigated agriculture would have been (and
remains) unpopular. At one time, all of the project's 120 full-time

44. For a comprehensive analysis, see TAYLOR 0. MILLER ET AL., THE SALTY COLORADO
(1986).
45. Id. at 24. The dam was closed in 1963, and the filling of Glen Canyon would
continue until 1980. COMMrrrEE TO REVIEW THE GLEN CANYON ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES,
RIVER AND DAm MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAdmATiON's GLEN CANYON
ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 19 (1987).
46. Friedkin, supra note 41, at 31-34.
47. Id. See also Rhn A. NADEAU, THE WATER SEEKERS 243-44 (1974).
48. Recommendations on the Colorado River Salinity Problem, Mar. 22, 1965; U.S.Mex., Minute No. 218, 21 U.S.T. 2481.
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farms could have been purchased outright by the government for a
49
fraction of the cost of the massive rescue projects.
In 1974, after twelve years of machinations, a final agreement
was reached.A0 It depended on legislation to fund bigger and more
expensive Reclamation rescue projects. In addition to pipelines, the
Bureau was to build a number of unprecedented salinity control
projects. The centerpiece was to be the world's largest desalination
plant. 5
Eighteen years later, the Yuma desalination plant is ready to
begin operations, having been completed at a cost of almost a
quarter of a billion dollars, many times the original authorization.
And it will cost over $20 million a year to operate.12 In addition,
Congress has spent hundreds of millions of public dollars to reduce
salinity through other projects built along the Colorado River by
the Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of Agriculture. 3
The Wellton-Mohawk story is a hideous debacle. The consequences-destruction of water quality, threats to international relations, environmental damage, costly bailouts-were all predictable.
As with the series of decisions that laid the foundation for the Aral
Sea disaster, decisionmakers were accountable for few consequences
of their decisions beyond their narrow mission. For the Bureau of
Reclamation, this meant serving the interests of the district's farmers.
Why did the Bureau of Reclamation and Congress persist in
their support of the Wellton-Mohawk Project, a ludicrously expensive, Rube Goldberg machine for polluting water? Like the Soviets,
they were charged with putting water to work to achieve a single
purpose. In this case it was to irrigate a salt-laden valley. They were
able to disregard the costs and consequences; indeed, it was uncomfortable and politically unpopular to ask whether the enterprise
made sense at all. Problems were "solved" a piece at a time. Each
new solution, a combination of money and water, grew a new crop
49. REISNER, supra note 41, at 482; see also BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, OFFICIAL REPORT
CROP PRODUCTION AND WATER UTILIZATION DATA FOR 1991, Sheet 1

ON WELLTON-MOHAWK,

of 5.
50. Agreement Confirming Minute No. 242 of the International Boundary and Water
Commission, Aug. 30, 1973, U.S.-Mex., 24 U.S.T. 1968.
51. Friedkin, supra note 41, at 38-41.
52. RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS,
AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 258-62 (1989) The plant will cost at least $234 million and
its operation and maintenance costs will amount to a projected $22.4 million per year. All
told, the estimated average cost of desalting water will be $583 per acre-foot. Id. at 261-62.
53. MILLER ET AL., supra note 44, at 37-45 (1989); DAvm H. GETCHES ET AL., CONTROLLING WATER USE: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION 77-78 (1991).
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of bigger and tougher problems. The results were predictable and
avoidable, but no one had overall responsibility for the effects on
the river's water quality, on the environment, and on foreign relations. And money was no object.
Both Wellton-Mohawk and the Aral Sea are public policy
disasters created by government officials determined to accomplish
a single-minded goal. They pursued only their mission of making
the desert bloom. They assumed that water could be manipulated
to accomplish that goal. Water was supposed to be a willing slave
for whom no task was too great, who would ask nothing and never
rebel. The more heroic the task asked of the water, the more difficult
the engineering, the more setbacks encountered, the clearer it should
have been that the schemes were risky and that the consequences
could be severe.
Central Asia is in ruins. Fortunately, the costs of our WelltonMohawk blunder are mostly economic, perhaps less than a billion
dollars. And it may be salvageable if the government is willing to
write-off the sunk costs. Retiring the least economic farmlands, thus
ending irrigation of the fields that produce hay and other low-valued
crops, would probably let the Bureau mothball the desalination
plant before it even opens, still fulfilling the treaty obligation to
Mexico, and leaving more water to use in the United States.54
III.

Los ANGELES

Los Angeles is the driving force in western water affairs. Figuratively, this is undeniable. L.A. stands for the pull of urban
economic power on water now used for irrigation or flowing naturally in streams. But it is true literally, too. Los Angeles-the city
and its Southern California neighbors-influences nearly every water
decision in the West.
54. MILLER, ET AL., supra note 44, at 72-73; GETCHES, ET AL., supra note 53, at 78.
See also WAHL, supra note 52, at 262-68 (discussing other alternatives).
In 1991, more than half of the districts' 65,000 irrigated acres produced low-valued crops
(cereals, hay, and seed) at an average yield per acre of about $550. If retiring this acreage
reduced Wellton-Mohawk divisions by one third (assuming the higher valued crops on the
other lands use twice as much water per acre) another 137,000 acre-feet of water would
remain in the river, largely supplanting the need for the 72,000 acre-feet of de-salted water
to dilute Wellton-Mohawk return flows. Looked at another way, the annual operation and
maintenance costs of the Yuma desalination plant are $22.4 million compared to the $18
million gross value of crops produced on the least productive half of the district's acreage.
By this calculus, it would be cheaper for the government to pay the farmers of those lands
an amount equivalent to their profits not to irrigate these lands and simply mothball the new
desalination plant. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, WELLTON-MOHAWK IRRIGATION AND DAMAGE
DIST., CROP PRODUCTION AND WATER UTILIZATION DATA FOR 1991 (1992).
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I arrived in L.A. in 1951. It was a pretty place with real palm
trees. But one of the most exciting things about it for a wide-eyed
boy, fresh from the drabness of rural upstate New York, was the
electric sense of growth and change. The first freeway was in use;
the trolley lines were being torn out. Subdivisions were being laid
out in orange groves, walnut orchards, and in the fields of truck
farmers. Schools could not be built fast enough to keep pace with
the growth-I went to fourth grade in a bus garage. Though schools
were in short supply, there was plenty of water. Thirty years before,
someone made sure that the water supply would accommodate
tremendous growth.
The story of L.A.'s raid on the Owens Valley's water, exaggerated only slightly in the movie Chinatown, is legendary. 5 Early
in the century, the city surreptitiously bought up most of the distant
valley. L.A. also holds the best rights to the huge State Water
Project, drawing from rivers at the top of the state. 6 In shortages
like those of the past few years, irrigators are cut off so that the
water can flow to L.A.
Perhaps the most intricate and elaborate plumbing system ever
designed ties California to six other states who share the Colorado
River either physically or legally. The biggest and best claim to the
river, however, belongs to Southern California.5 7 The seven Colorado River basin states (California, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado,
Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico) share other rivers they touch
with another seventeen states.5" Thus, if Southern California puts a
heavy draft on the Colorado River, the other states, like Colorado,
must draw on another water source to meet their demands, creating
a ripple effect across the West's waters.
Very early, L.A. sought water from far away. A miraculous
artesian fount59 gushing up in the middle of L.A. dwindled as more
wells sucked at the source. Towns spread out to cheap lands where
the wells still produced plenty of water. Once the wells were in
55. For a detailed description of the conflict, see WnILIAm L. KARmL, WATER AND
POWER: THE CONFLICT OVER Los ANGELES' WATER SUPPLY IN THE OWENS VALLEY (1982).
56. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER ALLOCATION DURING DROUGHT IN ARIZONA AND CALIFORNIA: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REsPONsEs 43 (Natural Resources Law Center, University
of Colorado Law School, 1991).
57. On the law allocating the Colorado River, see David H. Getches, Competing
Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 413 (1985).
58. Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky,
Illinois.
59. See, e.g. Reisner, supra note 41, at 64; Kahrl, supra note 55, at 25.
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pitched competition with one another, it was clear that water might
become an impediment to growth. The area has scant rainfall and
almost no surface streams. L.A.'s ambitious city fathers looked afar
for new sources. They dreamed beyond the imaginations of most
mortals and tied up the best rights to water from rivers hundreds
of miles away, rights that now dominate little valleys strung north
along the Sierra Nevadas.
Los Angeles also controls a plumbing system capable of draining the Central Valley of its native flows, drawing the water away
from big farms there, and of tapping into rivers of the far north
of the state that extend almost to Oregon. It can insist that people
in Colorado, Wyoming and Utah leave water in the Colorado River
for them. 60 And it has the pumps and pipes to distribute that water
almost anywhere in Southern California that anyone chooses to
plant a subdivision or green up a golf course.
If the existing influence of California's thirst were not significant enough, Congressman Roybal of California proposed a bill to
study the feasibility of laying a 1700-mile pipeline under the Pacific
Ocean to bring water from Alaska. 6. And in 1992, a Santa Barbara
company applied for rights to 350,000 acre-feet of Alaskan water
it planned to ship to Southern California using surplus single-hull
tankers (idled since the Valdez oil spill).62 These plans may sound
far-fetched as federal projects, but California is better equipped
than most states to get political support to solve its problems. The
state now has fifty-four members of Congress, 63 more than ten
percent of the House of Representatives, as many as fourteen other
states combined.
Colorado water decisions respond to California's actual or
perceived water demands. Negotiations are proceeding over a California proposal to set up an escrow account and water bank that
would provide money payments when California uses more than its
share of Colorado River water. 64 With no established policy on
interstate water sharing beyond adhering to the hard formality of
60. Colorado River Compact, Article InI(e), reprinted in CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101
(1990); see generally Getches, supra note 57.
61. H.R. 1600, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
62. WESTERN STATES WATER (No. 924), Jan. 31, 1992.
63. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 106 (1993).
64. See Conceptual Approach for Reaching Basin States Agreement on Interim Operation of Colorado River System Reservoirs, California's Use of Colorado River Water Above
Its Basic Apportionment, and Implementation of an Interstate Water Bank, prepared by the
State of California for the Colorado River Basin States Meeting (Aug. 28, 1991) (on file with
the University of Colorado Law Review).
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several interstate water compacts, Colorado necessarily has had to
negotiate in the glare of public scrutiny, and without the kind of
vigorous public debate and give-and-take that would accompany a
tax or education proposal. So sensitive is the process that comments
outside the negotiations were partly responsible for the discharge of

the State Engineer .65
Should Denver conserve water? Will Colorado's instream flow
protection law6 be used to keep rivers full of fish that satisfy anglers
and attract tourists? The answer may have less to do with Colorado's
benefits than with California's. Westerners have disparaged water
conservation as a "brick-in-the-toilet mentality" that simply does
not apply to them. 67 They oppose maintaining streamflows even
when Coloradans benefit because, unlike water taken out of the
stream, the flowing water could also be used in a downstream state.
For years Colorado's substitute for a water policy was a mindless
commitment to "develop our compact apportionment" of water, as
if building great reservoirs to hold and evaporate all the water
Colorado is legally entitled to use were an end in itself. 6
Some of the water projects Colorado earnestly sought from the
United States government would not have achieved goals of producing more crops, getting richer, having a more beautiful state, or
making the state a better place for our children to live. They would
only have perfected a physical claim on the state's share of water.
Among the federal projects authorized by Congress at the behest
of Colorado's twelve-term Congressman, Wayne Aspinall, were some
that would flood more acreage than they would irrigate and cost
as much as $1.2 million per farm in order to grow hay in high
altitude meadows. 69 It was like a beer drinking contest with a giant.
California was consuming its share and we Coloradans would choke
ours down even if it killed us. Mercifully, the worst of the projects
will not be built.
Decisions in Arizona also are driven by California's demands.
A growing Arizona city may buy out a ranch so the underlying
groundwater can be mined to support urban expansion. The decision
65. Lori Potter & Andrew Caputo, Romer's Response to Dissenters:Fire Them, DENVER
POST, Mar. 14, 1992, at 7B; Ken Salazar, Compact Guards Colorado's Water Rights, id.
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1990).
67. RICHARD D. LAMm & MICHAEL McCARTHY, THE ANGRY WEST 190 (1982) (quoting

former Utah Gov. Scott Matheson).
68. See D. Monte Pascoe, Plans and Studies: The Recent
Utilization of Colorado's Water Resources, 55 U. COLO. L. REv.
69. Getches, supra note 57, at 450; Colorado River Basin
L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 (1968) (codified in scattered sections

Quest for a Utopia in the
391 (1984).
Project Act of 1968, Pub.
of 43 U.S.C.)

538

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

to pump Arizona groundwater may be a result of California's
demand for Colorado River water that in turn makes less water
available in Arizona.
Agriculture is likely to be the source of water to slake Southern
California's burgeoning demand. Whose agriculture will it be? As
the nation's largest producer of farm goods, California could choose
to remove water from the Central Valley or Imperial Valley or to
negotiate with other states (like Colorado) to secure water from
irrigators there, trading agriculture for urban growth.
Southern California-more than 34,000 square miles of semiarid
desert lands-is rapidly becoming one big megalopolis. Some 4200
square miles are counted within the highly developed metropolitan
area. 70 Over fourteen million people live there. 71 Seventy-eight per72
cent of the water for these people must be imported from afar.
Yet they use it as if it comes from a limitless source. The prescribed
lifestyle includes a grass lawn, exotic plantings, and a swimming
pool.
Some politicians and editorialists have criticized Southern California's water establishment for inadequately preparing for the
recent six-year drought. 73 In reality, water officials have succeeded
mightily at what they were charged with doing.
Criticism is better directed at the charge that was given, not
the result that was achieved. Water officials were never asked to
account for the consequences of pretending that water was no object,
and that its development was costless. It would have been logical
to ask what tradeoffs were involved in perpetuating a myth of
abundant water, but no one wanted to hear the harsh truth. Before
undertaking unprecedented engineering feats, before sacrificing an
established agricultural economy like that in the Owens Valley, it
would have been reasonable to ask where these decisions were
leading and what the alternatives might be. Before financing and
building thousands of miles of aqueducts, did anyone ask where
they would lead?
Suppose some visionary decisionmaker in Los Angeles had
asked for the "truth," the full story concerning the consequences
70. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

35-37 (1992).

71. Id. at 31.

72.

GETCHES, supra note 56, at 48.
73. See, e.g., Jenifer Warren & Virginia Ellis, Water Deliveries to Farmers Cut to Aid
Fish Conservation: Plan is Designed to Save Threatened Salmon in Sacramento River, L.A.
Tins, Feb. 14, 1992, at A3. At the time of publication, California's drought was showing
signs of abatement, with several massive snowfalls in the Sierra Nevada. Nevertheless, the
drought is not "over" until reservoirs refill.
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of ordering a virtually unlimited supply of water to be on tap for
Los Angeles. Suppose the decisionmaker had grasped the impact of
spreading a megalopolis along the dry foothills from San Fernando
down to Riverside, west to the cliffs of the Pacific Coast, from the
wilds of the Santa Monica Mountains south to the sweltering desert
below San Diego. This knowledge could have influenced and altered
decisions, perhaps giving Southern California a very different face
and feel.
Suppose someone had asked: "Should we keep bringing in an
unlimited supply of water to wherever developers may want it? We
may find the water, but can we tolerate what goes with it: the
transportation problems, loss of the unspoiled coast and mountains,
pollution, and the great exposure of people and property to natural
disasters?" If concerns like this had been aired it may have led to
a development plan that provided housing and transportation and
jobs and public services for millions of people, all designed to avoid
problems. Of course, that is not the way we think about decisions,
now or then, but it is fun to speculate on "the Southern California
that might have been."
The Southern California that might have been could include
several concentrated urban areas, planned communities with clusters
of buildings containing workplaces and homes, tightly developed
around a core area. Between those cities might be open spaces,
unspoiled valleys and rolling hills where people could hike, bicycle,
picnic, and watch and hunt wildlife. There would be some ranches
and resorts, but population density would remain sparse outside
core cities. The mountains would begin in foothills that today are
crammed with residential development where residents now risk
periodic flooding and fires. The coastline would be a place of natural
beauty and recreation. There would be great vistas instead of the
phalanxes of houses that now block passage to-and even a glimpse
of-the Pacific.
The sprawl that characterizes the L.A. area gives it a relatively
low population density for a major city of the world.74 But because
everything is spread out without a central core, it has the nation's
7
highest ratio of cars to people, as well as the worst air pollution.
74. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 818 (1993). At 9120 people per square mile,
L.A.'s population density ranks 76th among the largest cities in the world and but a fraction
of Hong Kong's 247,500, Bombay's 127,000, and Mexico City's 40,000 people per square
mile. Id.
75. 1989 EPA data showed that Los Angeles had the highest levels of ozone and carbon
monoxide in the nation. Air Pollution: Ozone Standard Violated in 96 Areas; 41 Fail on
Carbon Monoxide, EPA Says, 21 ENv'T REp. (BNA) 815 (1990).
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It is an area where passage, and almost every aspect of life, depends
on a vast network of six, eight, and even ten lane "freeways,"
where lines of cars (usually with only a driver inside) crawl along
in an eternal traffic jam. One study shows that two-thirds of the
76
urban land is dedicated to transportation.
The people making the earliest decisions about water-people
like William Mulholland, Fred Eaton, and Harry Chandler-had a
personal stake. They gained hundreds of millions of dollars and
considerable power in land speculation. 77 And they set in motion
the growth frenzy that has characterized Southern California for
most of this century. Why would they worry about the good of the
community and the consequences for other areas?
Once the rapacious developer-politicians took their profits, more
rational decisions might have taken hold had it not been for the
political fragmentation of the area. "Los Angeles" became not a
single city but a jigsaw puzzle of wall-to-wall cities vying for a tax
78
base. Today there are 160 separate cities in Southern California,
but it is impossible to tell where one stops and the next begins.
Like the early developers' greed, the cities' independent and competitive spirits have discouraged discussions of long-range consequences and alternatives. When it comes to water, they are interested
only in making sure there is enough to support the most lucrative
growth that can be squeezed into their boundaries.
IV.

LESSONS AND SOLUTIONS

It is too late to have the Southern California that might have
been, had water development been delayed long enough for people
to reflect on the probable consequences. But it is not too late to
take control of future growth and water allocation.
The issue is not a lack of water. Ample water is available to
support enough growth to crowd even the most zealous booster. A
solution would be to retire some of California's croplands from
irrigation. There would be enough water for another seventy million

76. See Sierra Club report entitled, GREEN STATE OF THE STATE, described in Traffic
Endangers State's Future, Two Groups Warn, L.A. TnesS, Feb. 2, 1990, at Al.
77. REISNER, supra note 41, at 63-80; KAHRL, supra note 55, at 180-203. Although these
men were constantly accused of conflict-of-interest in their water dealings, they were never
formally charged.
78. A Survey of California: Success and Excess, EcoNowsT, Oct. 13, 1990, at Survey
p.16 (appearing as an appendix).
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people.79 There is also water available for purchase from Colorado,
from Indian tribes, and others. The problem is not a shortage of
water, it is a shortage of sound policy, a failure to consider comprehensively what will be done with the water and the consequences
of doing it.
Southern California must decide whether to trade off more
population growth against its lifestyle. More subdivisions with backyards and lawns are possible but available land is far from most
jobs. If the land is to be developed to clone more of the towns
with invisible boundaries that characterize Southern California, the
state will have to sacrifice some of its agriculture to get enough
water. There will also be environmental problems and ripple effects
felt hundreds of miles and several states away. There will be more
freeways to take people from far-flung housing developments to
jobs hours from home. Already tens of thousands of people in
Southern California commute over 70 miles to work. With this
comes a plethora of other consequences, like health-damaging air
pollution and even erosion of the communities and families that
sacrifice people to hours of commuting.
Alternatively, cities in Southern California might continue accepting more people without spreading out. If so, existing communities must be redesigned and rebuilt. This can be done with no
more water, by building more condominiums and cluster developments to replace ranch-style homes. Needs for outdoor recreation
can be met with more parks to replace the backyards lost. It is not
impossible; Seattle has built some parks over its freeways. The least
popular and least likely course for Southern California is to exercise
the political will needed to manage and contain future growth. It
simply is not consistent with the image of Southern California
lifestyle. But plainly, more people cannot fit in the presently developed space without measurable changes in lifestyle. The image is
impossible to sustain.
Any acceptable solution for L.A. must come -from regional
governance and cooperation, an alien concept in the region. 0 The
last time interests in Southern California came together and solidly
cooperated was during the first quarter of the century, when they

79. MARC

REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR

33 (1990). Retiring pasture, alfalfa, rice and cotton crops would reduce
agricultural income by only 15% and the overall state income by only 0.25%. Id.
80. Charles Lockwood & Christopher D. Leinberger, Los Angeles Comes of Age,
ATtANTIc MONTHLY, Jan. 1988, at 31, 54-56.
WESTERN WATER
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unified to import Colorado River water."' Of course, they were
committed to achieving a particular end, not to exploring the wisdom
of that end.
No single approach is right for all places and all people. The
choice of economies, land use patterns, lifestyles, and the water
uses that support them demands a complex consideration of factors,
beginning with a deep concern for the nature of the lands and
cultures who are subject to the decisions. Water policy disasters are
the result of systems that disregard these factors.
Central planners in the former Soviet Union were insensitive
to historical experiences of the people of Central Asia who had
been growing irrigated crops there for millennia. Huge canals had
diverted the Amu Darya's waters by 1000 B.C. Abundant crops
were grown in oases and in desert valleys where irrigation was
practical. Control of water facilities was a focal point of early
political organization."2 Some ecological harm had been experienced,
especially when wars destroyed irrigation systems and changed runoff patterns.8 3 The limits of the region's capacity for irrigation also
were exposed occasionally by crop failures and depleted soils. Yet
the tribal people of the region produced their crops without materially depleting or damaging the Aral Sea, which maintained a
thriving fishing industry. People were using land and water and
living on the available natural resources without destroying the sea
or destabilizing the natural environment until a central decision was
made to depart from these successful patterns of resource use.84
Is it too late to save the Aral Basin? Some say it is. Just to
stabilize the sea at its present level and prevent further destruction
would require a fifty-percent reduction in irrigated acreage, 5 an
impossible scenario in an area suffering severe economic distress.
But converting farms to food crops with more benign effects on
the soil, retiring some lands, rehabilitating irrigation systems, revitalizing small subsistence farms, and attracting industry that does
not depend on water are all alternatives to the present course. These
measures could relieve the crisis.
Wherever I went in Central Asia, officials and academics assumed that our answer would be "privatization." Market mechan81. NAD Au, supra note 47, at 192-94.
82. Gregory Gleason, The Struggle for Control over Water in Central Asia: Republican
Sovereignty and Collective Action, REP. oN U.S.S.R., June 21, 1991, at 11.
83. Glazovsky, supra note 7, at 1-2.
84. Id. at 2-4; Ellis, supra note 8, at 76; Micklin, supra note 10, at 1171.
85. Ellis, supra note 8, at 92.
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isms are being urged as solutions to the American West's water
problems. 6 A New York Times editorial recently opined that the
"real" water problem in California "is the failure to allow markets,
8' 7
rather than politicians and planners, to decide who gets what.
Surely, restraints on water transfers and disincentives to economic behavior are to blame for many of the West's water problems;
injecting market principles and pricing are essential. Farmers should
pay something closer to the true costs of developing and delivering
the water. If they can enjoy some profit from transferring water to
more efficient uses, there is an opportunity for them and others to
prosper.
Solving-or avoiding-problems like Wellton-Mohawk or the
Aral Sea could benefit tremendously from free market tools. Central
Asians might have achieved some kind of balance between food
and fiber production and between agriculture and fisheries, not to
mention a balance between lifestyle and production. Farmers in the
Wellton-Mohawk District might have been bought out long ago
because their farming uses produce a value far less than the costs
that were necessarily incurred to keep them irrigating a saline, closed
basin. But in both cases the politics of single-purpose decisions
prevailed. Intensive agricultural use of water was favored in one
case to sustain the symbolism of the Reclamation program and in
the other to prove a nation's capacity to produce an exportable
surplus. Nevertheless, there was no place in the systems of decisionmaking for the people and interests that were affected.
Simplification of water law to allow the use of economics to
solve western water problems was proposed in 1991 by a conservative
congressman who introduced a bill for the "Abundant Water Act"
to put western water firmly in the free market.88 The Act would
have overriden all water laws in eleven western states to the extent
necessary to subject water and water rights to private ownership
and to make it tradeable without government restriction.
86. Professor Terry Anderson advocates changing from supply management to demand
management. He suggests that allowing an "open market" that reflects the true price of
water is the only way to meet demand. TERY L. ANDERSON, Introduction: The Water Crisis
and the New Resource Economics, in WATER RIGHTs: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BuRAucRAcY, AND Ti ENVIRONMENT 1 (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983). See also Kenneth D.
Frederick, Overview, in SCARCE WATER AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE I (Kenneth D. Frederick

ed., 1986);
EMERGING

THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION,

AMERICA'S WATER:

CURRENT TRENDS AND

ISSUES 54 (1984).

87. Peter Passell, Soaking Lawns, Not Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at D2.
88. H.R. 2687, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (sponsored by Rep. William D. Dannemeyer).
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To be sure, our system of western water law is imperfect, but
all the flaws cannot be fixed simply by declaring a free market in
water. It does not follow that changing the system to create an
unfettered market in water will make the world or the West a better
place. A system based on market economics would improve rationality of water decisions and would anticipate economic consequences
to entities involved in a transaction. But it would not necessarily
make the system fairer or the outcome better for those not directly
involved.8 9 The system needs more pervasive attention in order to
consider all of the effects related to water decisions.
V.

THE WEST'S QUAINT WATER LAW IN FLUX

An obsession with gold led to the accidental creation of the
prior appropriation water law that predominates in the West. 9° Early
California miners embraced a simple first come, first served rule to
resolve their disputes. The rule spread across the West. Its .convenience, order, and certainty made it a ready-to-wear garment suited
for the farmers who followed. When this simple, first-in-time method
of allocating rights failed to be a sufficient incentive for investments
in irrigation systems, the government stepped in with federal aid to
make use of privately held water rights that had been carved out
of the western public lands. The Reclamation Act of 190291 superimposed a massive subsidy program over arrays of water rights.
Cities were able to use the water rights system to their advantage. Laws embodying the "use it or lose it" ideal were bent to
allow cities to plan ahead many years, appropriating water for
future populations. 92 What was denied to mere private parties as
89. An essential problem with water transfers in the West is the failure to consider and
account for the interests of third parties. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 249 (1992); Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Transferring Water Uses in the West, 43
OKLA. L. REV. 119 (1990).

90. The basic notion of "first in time, first in right," which controls much of prior
appropriation law, was developed by miners in the early West mimicking their own rules for
preventing mining claim disputes. 1 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE
NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 159-75 (1971). California, in the case of Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal.

140 (1855), was the first state to recognize the doctrine of prior appropriation.
91. Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. beginning
at § 372).
92. E.g., in City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836 (Colo. 1939), the court
held that a statutory provision gave cities with a population of 200,000 and over the right to
appropriate water not only for immediate use, but for an adequate supply to meet reasonable
future needs. In City and -County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.,
276 P.2d 992, 997 (Colo. 1954), the court stated that "when appropriations are sought by a
growing city, regard should be given to its reasonably anticipated requirements."
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impermissible speculation was allowed to "great and growing cities"
as an exercise in prudence. Agriculture was the rallying cause for
construction and public funding of Reclamation projects, but the
largest segment of economic value derived from these projects today
has come from electrical power generated and water used in cities.93
Though private rights stand out in practice, western state constitutions and laws all recite that water is a public resource. 94 Usually
the same or the next sentence in the law provides that the public
resource can be reduced to private possession to the extent it is put
to "beneficial use." 95 In the utilitarian zeal of the nineteenth century
the importance of creating private rights eclipsed the importance of
preserving public uses. Furthermore, it was in the public interest to
give loft to the fledgling economy, and private water rights did just
that.
So the inherently public character of water was subordinated
to the dominant purpose of expanding mining, farming, and cities.
That is changing now. There is a strong reform movement. The
mission of water law reform is neither as narrow as boosting the
vitality of the market nor as radical as uprooting the present system.
Charles Wilkinson captured the imaginations of western readers
in 1991 with his clever eulogy in the High Country News for "Prior
Appropriation," personified as the grand old man of western water.9 His symbolic rites for Prior Appropriation made the point
that we are evolving into an entirely new regime for dealing with
water. But there is a long way to go.
As a result of its history, what is conspicuously
absent in
western water policy is a holistic, integrating perspective. Instead of
bringing vision to issues, institutions are reductionist, isolating and
simplifying water decisions. In the West, our laws make water
93. See, e.g., WAnt,supra note 52, at 11-46.
94. See DAVrD H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 82 (2d ed. 1990).
95. Many states have provided broad statutory definitions of "beneficial use." In
Colorado, for example,
"[bleneficial use" is that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under
reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which
the appropriation is lawfully made and, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, includes the impoundment of water for recreational purposes, including
fishery or wildlife.
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1990). Some other state legislatures have not provided
statutory definitions, leaving the courts to interpret the term's meaning. See, e.g., Idaho Dept.
of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924 (Idaho 1974). For a survey of what
different states include in their definitions of "beneficial use," see GETCHES, supra note 94,
at 98.
96. Charles F. Wilkinson, West's Grand Old Water Doctrine Dies, HIGH COUNTRY
NEws, Aug. 12, 1991, at 1.
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allocation an essentially local or private concern. We follow the
consequences of a commitment of water only so far as the next
water user. If no other private users are affected, that is the end
of the matter. Traditionally, water users-power companies, cities,
irrigation districts-have been able to pursue their single-minded
goals without thought of what the trade-offs or consequences might
be. Los Angeles violates no law, even at the height of a drought,
when it keeps golf courses green, slathers cars with suds in automated car washes, or spreads new ranch-style subdivisions with big
lawns over the former haunts of the desert tortoise. L.A. need not
turn down its taps, because it has great "legal rights" and a
magnificent plumbing system; not even when people in Northern
California bathe from buckets; not even when farmers in the Central
Valley turn to wells that pump so hard the valley floor sinks and
aquifers become saltier; not even when people in Colorado, New
Mexico, and Utah must curtail water uses to let water flow to
California; not even when the result is to destroy recreational uses
or to draw river flows so low that fish die.
If the failing of water policy from Ashkabad, to WelltonMohawk, to Los Angeles has been a single-minded pursuit of specific
goals, the solution is to broaden the interests and the issues that
can and must be considered in water decisions. That certainly means
major changes in the way decisions are made to build dams, but it
goes much farther. Water decisions cannot be merely a private or
local concern. There must be a way to bring everyone who has a
stake into the decision and to make the decision with as much
information, vision, and wisdom as possible. The West needs to
build a comprehensive policy, and to make a commitment to general
principles in advance of particular decisions. This means suffering
the debate and differences of opinion that are inevitably involved.
Throughout the West, we are moving in this direction. Most
states require broad considerations of the public interest when new
rights are granted and when old rights are put to new uses. 97 A few
states, like Kansas, Montana, and Oregon, have instituted thoroughgoing policy planning processes that ask the tough questions and
97. E.g., the Utah Code provides that the state engineer is directed to reject or limit
any application to appropriate unappropriated waters where the approval of the application
would prove detrimental to the public welfare. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (1989). Washington
has a similar requirement. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.03.290 (West 1992). Nebraska
provides that "the right to divert unappropriated waters of every natural stream for beneficial
use shall never be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public interest." NEB.
REv. STAT. § 53 (1988).
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address where the state should be going with its future water use. 9

How much water should be kept flowing? What is the state's
position on filling in wetlands? How will transfers of water from
one watershed to another be handled? Issues touch the future of
agriculture, industry, recreation, wildlife, urban land use, the future
of rural communities, and more. They are all part of a water policy
and belong in a planning process.
Environmental laws have revolutionized the way water decisions
are made. 99 But federal environmental laws can take decisions away
from people who are the most affected, avoiding putting them face-

to-face with others who propose to commit water to some new
purpose. The water-use decision and the environmental protection

decision are separated. Consider the decision on Denver's controversial Two Forks Dam. Water suppliers had a specific mission and
they pursued it. The state lacks a process for reviewing the consequences of water projects. Under state law, anyone with a water
right can proceed to dam or divert or dry up a stream so long as

no other person with water rights complains.'00 But after years of
preparation, the Two Forks project was thwarted when its consequences were subjected to review under a federal law that protects
wetlands-section 404 of the Clean Water Act.' 01
Regulations under section 404 opened up a review of the "public
interest" in the project and a look at the alternatives. 102 That

someone in Washington had to find that Two Forks did not pass
muster was distasteful even to Coloradans who agreed with the
outcome. Yet Colorado has no way to involve a wide community
98. The Kansas planning process charges the State Water Office with formulating a
state water plan which must consider programs and projects emphasizing efficient use,
multipurpose reservoir sites, and safeguards for human and animal health through water
quality management, existing water rights, groundwater, instrean flow protection, habitat
protection, and cooperation among different levels of government. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a907 (1989). For a review of water planning, see David H. Getches, Water Planning: Untapped
Opportunity for the Western States, 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 1 (1988).
99. E.g., § 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988); Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1281-87 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(b) (1988), all discussed in CHARLES J.
MEYERS, ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEmENT

(3d ed. 1988).

100. In Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855), the court held that if a miner chooses
to locate on a stream where the waters were already appropriated, "he has no right to
complain, no right to interfere with the prior occupation of his neighbor, and must abide the
disadvantages of his own selection."
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
102. The decision to issue a permit is based on an evaluation of the probable impacts,
including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity and its intended use on the public
interest. General Policies for Evaluating Permit Applications, 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (1992).
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of interests in a probing analysis of the objectives and consequences
of creating demand for water on the Front Range. There is no
forum to ask what kind of lifestyle people want, what the decision
means for land use, transportation, recreation, agriculture, tourism,
education, wildlife, and more. Like L.A., Colorado will not ask the
hard questions.
Surely there are encouraging signs. Market-oriented approaches,
environmental laws, and reforms in western water law all force a
more comprehensive consideration of the consequences of water
decisions. The seventy-year water development binge that gave us
Wellton-Mohawk and its brethren is over. But the improvements
that are underway fall short of the kind of policy quest that I am
advocating. They fail to force us to seek out the broad communities
of interest that are affected by major water commitments and to
press us for tough decisions.
There are strong pressures for improving the capacity of water
law to come to grips with alternatives and consequences of water
use. So-called water policy reformers'013 are focused on modest trimming and repair work on the system. They tend to be fixed on
palliatives: adding incentives to make water use more efficient,
building in some public interest review criteria into water decisions,
considering third-party effects of water transfers, and merging water
quality control with water allocation. They urge changing reclamation law to improve efficiency and to make project water more
easily transferable.
All these so-called reforms are making a difference, and they
are tremendously important. But they are neither new nor enough.
Reasonable "reforms" have been pressed for years. Nearly all can
be traced to the early, landmark work of Gilbert White' °4 and
others; 10 5 many are found in the National Water Commission's 1973
report. 0 6 The ideas are, at last, in the mainstream of western policy,
with the central issue being how best to package and incorporate
103. See Greg Hobbs, Water Use Justifies Non-Injurious Water Quality Alteration: A
Response to David Getches, Larry MacDonnell and Teresa Rice, WATER CT. REP., Summer
1991, at 3 (listing Marc Reisner, Charles Wilkinson, David Getches, and Bruce Driver as
"water reformers").
104. See Gilbert White, A Perspective of River Basin Development, 22 LAW & CONTEM'.
PRODS. 157-84 (1957).
105. See, e.g., GEORGE P. MARSH, THE EARTH As MODIFIED BY HUMAN ACTION-A LAST

REVISION OF "MAN AND NATURE" 472-74 (1898); W. J. McGee, The Flood Plains of Rivers,
11 FORUM 221-34 (1891) (both of which first recognizing the need for comprehensive river
basin management.
106. E.g., U.S. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER PoLICIEs FOR rtm FUTURE, Recommendation 10-14, at 394 (1973).
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them in the existing legal system. But governments still have not
confronted the root cause of water problems: the absence of a
comprehensive water policy. Such a policy admits that major commitments of water usually commit people and places to extraordinary
consequences and it integrates these water decisions with broader
social and resource decisions.
VI.

TowARD COmPREHENSlVE WATER POLICIES

Water allocation and water development are pivotal policy
decisions. They mark the point at which society can pause to reflect
on the alternatives and the consequences of investing a public
resource. Introducing market-driven efficiencies, environmental safeguards, and public interest reviews will help cushion the consequences, but may just delay the day of reckoning when we ask why
we have let things get so bad. Six years of drought has caused some
in L.A. to question the present course. Still, no one is pressing the
big questions: "What do we really want for the region? How do
we accomplish it? Do we really need more water?"
A. New Institutions
Realization of a comprehensive, integrated approach to water
policy requires new institutions that respond to wide communities

of interest. Regional and international bodies must be formed with
the mandate of integrating water decisions and their consequences
with the aspirations of society in the area affected by the decision.
The boundaries of watersheds should be the presumptive starting
point, and we should look outward from there.
Throughout the West, problems cry out for multi-interest solutions. Regular institutions are needed that span jurisdictions and
include more interests. For instance, the Colorado River basin must
have a forum or authority that brings together all the parties affected
by commitments of the river.' 07 States, tribes, environmentalists,
recreational users, electrical power interests, irrigators, and others
should struggle together to craft long term, sustainable policies.
Basinwide, multi-interest decisionmaking is difficult but not
impossible. The Columbia River basin has the Pacific Northwest
107. See David H. Getches, A Colorado River.Basin Authority: Opportunity for Sharing

River Basin Management and Resources, in BOUNDARIES AND WATER: ALLOCATION AND USE
OF A SHARED RESOURCE 24 (Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado Law
School, 1989).
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Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act.t8 A governing council tries to deal with problems of hydroelectric power created by the
great dams on the river system: Indian fishing rights, endangered
salmon, and energy conservation. They are beginning to confront
the problems of pollution from logging and farming and of irrigation
diversions. It is a start toward comprehensive, multi-jurisdictional
9
policymaking and implementation. 10
Indian water settlements have gotten parties to set aside old
animosities and fears and catalyzed a process to deal with multiple
issues even without setting up permanent institutions." 0 The most
significant example is the historic Pyramid Lake Paiute settlement
on the Truckee River."' The Truckee was the victim of a century
of ad hoc decisions and unsolved problems: appropriations of water
under state law; a notoriously wasteful Reclamation project; a
wildlife refuge formed by wastewater from irrigation; a huge desert
lake shrinking away and becoming saline; two endangered species
of fish; dozens of lawsuits over Indian water rights; an interstate
dispute; and great uncertainty over the future availability of water
for municipal growth. So the diverse stakeholders gave up on "the
system" and crafted their own solution. Two states, two tribes,
growing cities, federal agencies, environmentalists, a power company, and a variety of water users all had a stake in the allocation
of Truckee River waters. With the tenacity and leadership of the
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and its attorney, they negotiated hard
and came away with something."12 They worked out a sensible way
to confront the future.
How inclusive should institutions be? City water departments,
irrigation districts, and the Bureau of Reclamation all have mandates
too narrow to leave them with ultimate authority over any major
water decision. A plan or project or major allocation of water has
broad public importance and should involve all those who are
affected. It should ideally include the entire community of interest
influenced by a plan or policy.
108. 16 U.S.C. § 839b (1988).
109. John M. Volkman & Kai N. Lee, Within the Hundredth Meridian: Western States
and Their River Basins in a Time of Transition, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 551, 562-65 (1988).
110. John A. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve Water
Disputes Involving Indian Rights, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 63 (1988).
111. Fallon-Paiute Shoshone Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-618, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668d & note; 43 U.S.C. § 614 note).
112. Bonnie Colby et al., MitigatingEnvironmental Externalities Through Voluntary and
Involuntary Water Reallocation: Nevada's Truckee-Carson River Basin, 31 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 757 (1991).
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The consequences of Los Angeles's decisions-the many overlapping communities of interest-reach as far as the headwaters of
the river systems that feed it, and beyond to the other communities
who depend on or compete for the same waters in half the states
in the lower forty-eight. The communities may include a farmer
growing crops in the Central Valley, a Las Vegas casino buying
electricity, a family floating through the Grand Canyon, a fisherman
on the Gunnison River, skiers at Keystone, and an Indian tribe
seeking drinking water for its Colorado reservation.
"Communities" also include wily trout and endangered squawfish, noble salmon, and lowly brine shrimp. They include eagles
and whooping cranes and ducks. The networks of dependence on
Los Angeles's water decisions extend from the melting snows on
mountaintops to ancient lakes, to deltas and estuaries never seen
by L.A. residents. Those networks connect with other cities and
farms taking water from the same sources. The networks of dependence follow people who use or only visit these areas. And they
follow the migratory patterns of birds and fish that range to the
Northwest and the Southwest, to Canada and Mexico, to Alaska,
Japan and to the Commonwealth of Independent States.
B.

Long Range Goals

"Policy" should be stated in terms of broad, long-term goals.
A water policy, thus, should not be "to preserve and protect existing
rights," but should be in terms of society's goals. Those goals
should be more inclusive than "to promote agriculture," or "to
accommodate urban expansion." Imagine an economic policy or
foreign policy or air quality goal so simplistic and narrow. Plainly,
there are multiple effects to be assessed, and there must be multiple
objectives to be coordinated within any water policy. A comprehensive policy seeks to achieve ends like economic security and
stability, ecological integrity, and a satisfying quality of human life.
Emerging governments in Ashkabad, Tashkent, and the capitals
of other Central Asian states should not go ahead with plans for a
project to irrigate new farmlands or to rescue their ailing cotton
industry without looking at the alternatives and consequences, or
considering some far-reaching questions. They must ask what they
ultimately want from a new irrigation project. The answer should
not be simply "more irrigated land" or "more farm products." It
ought to be something like "adequate resources to support our
people sustainably." They must ask whether food crops make better
sense than cotton, whether agriculture should be phased down in
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favor of, say, mining and industrial expansion, what the effects will
be on nonrenewable resources, and whether a population control
program will be necessary in any event.
Every major decision is an opportunity to ask what we are
trying -to accomplish with water, and whether the goal could be
properly accomplished in other ways. The epitome of this approach
is the 1968 report of a National Academy of Sciences panel"'
suggesting that education might be a wiser investment of public
money in Arizona's economic expansion than the behemoth Central
Arizona Project (CAP). Of course, such an alternative was never
seriously considered; the finishing touches are now being put on the
CAP.
C. Alternatives and Consequences
Major water commitments should trigger a thorough examination of alternatives and consequences. As water development
becomes more difficult and expensive we should pause longer and
think harder about its consequences. Water policy should not simply
be the handmaiden of the proponents of growth and development.
It should search and account for the consequences of each new
decision that gives information back to decisionmakers who are
politically responsible to the public.
Los Angeles, forced by the cyclical reduction in water supply
that they call a drought," 4 should use the occasion to think beyond
desalination plants, rate increases, and schemes to lease farmers'
water rights. Before heroic efforts are made to change existing
economies or alter even further the natural order, the ostensible
"water problem" could be an occasion to ask questions the Mulhollands and Chandlers would not ask: What kind of lifestyle do
we want in twenty or fifty years? Where should the undeveloped
lands-mountains and beaches-begin? Will our grandchildren have
a chance to see condors? How many more people can live here?
113. NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Pun. No.

1689,

WATER AND CHOICE IN THE COLORADO

BASIN 59-62 (1968).
114. In fact, data based on tree-ring studies show that far more frequent and more
severe drought events are typical of the region than the flow regimes experienced in the

decades since most population growth occurred. The average virgin flow spanning more than
400 years is only 13.5 million acre-feet while recorded flows since 1922 have averaged 14.4
million acre-feet. See GETCHES, supra note 56, at 5, 13 n.5. Furthermore, in 11 of the last
60 years, there have been lower flows than the 10.3 million acre-feet of average flow during

the four-year drought from 1988-1991.
RIVER COMINSSION 22-23 (1991).
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This principle requires that the laws and policies being written
by the emerging states of Central Asia grapple with the major issues
that are implicated by water use and development: land tenure,
water allocation, economic policy, health, environmental quality,
and international relations. A discussion of how to manage the Amu
Darya opens up fundamental policy issues for these new nations. It
will require regional cooperation, across state (formerly republic)
lines and across international boundaries with Afghanistan and Iran.
CONCLUSION

Los Angeles is only a metaphor, one that stands for sprawling
metropolises throughout the West. Phoenix, Tucson, Las Vegas,
Salt Lake City, Albuquerque, and Denver all are guilty of committing water to undisciplined growth, without hesitating to ask why
and what they really aspire to be. They pursue more and more
water to support thousands of square miles of houses surrounded
by Kentucky bluegrass, which in turn must be linked by highways
to shopping malls and distant workplaces, which in turn are traveled
by hundreds of thousands of pollution-belching cars, and so on.
And the water itself, the water that makes all this possible, is taken
away from streams that once teemed with fish, from farms that
have turned to dust, from Indian reservations that never got a
chance to develop water for their own uses, and from small towns
that had viable economies until the cities drew away their water.
Political leaders and members of the public alike assume that
water matters are surrounded with difficult technical issues requiring
special knowledge. Citizens and officials have abdicated responsibility for major water decisions to cliques of "water experts." This
effectively promulgates a policy by default. Because the consequences of water decisions can pervade economies and lifestyles
across entire regions and generations, water policy should belong to
everyone and reflect a conscious choice. From Ashkabad, to Wellton-Mohawk, to Los Angeles, water policy should no longer be
made by default.

